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Chapter 3
The Transformation of Investment Advice:
Digital Investment Advisors as Fiduciaries
Jennifer L. Klass and Eric L. Perelman
The landscape for investment advice is shifting, and an innovative model
has emerged that combines technology and investment expertise to deliver
high-quality advice at a lower cost than traditional investment advisory
services. Digital or so-called ‘robo-advisors’ that use algorithms and tech-
nology to offer discretionary investment advice through a digital interface
continue to experience a rapid growth in popularity. A recent survey of the
industry found that digital investment advisory programs accounted for
managed assets in excess of $200 billion globally (Eule 2018; AT Kearny
2015). The term ‘digital advisor’ encompasses a broad range of business
models. Digital advisors include both independent investment advisors that
focus on offering digital advice directly to retail consumers, as well as
established financial industry incumbents who include a ‘digital’ offering
among a broad suite of advisory and brokerage services. Other digital
advisors pursue an intermediary model where they partner with financial
institutions to develop ‘white label’ digital advisor programs, or serve as a
sub-advisor or technology provider to such firms’ proprietary digital
programs.
Although humans are actively involved in the design of digital advisory
offerings and formulation of investment advice, the degree to which hu-
mans are involved in the delivery of that advice varies depending on the
business model. In its purest form, a digital advisor will only provide asset
allocation advice and investment recommendations through a digital inter-
face. Clients are able to contact the firm by e-mail, chat, or telephone only
for technical support or to ask operational or administrative questions.
Increasingly, however, digital advisors operate a so-called ‘hybrid’ model
under which clients have the option to consult with financial advisors.
Under the hybrid model, financial advisors supplement the digital advisor’s
automated functions and serve as an additional resource for clients.
Regardless of the business model, digital advisors generally leverage tech-
nology to automate both the client experience and the portfolio manage-
ment process. Other common characteristics of digital advisors include:
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• Primary reliance on a digital (web-based and mobile) interface to
interact with clients, collect client profile information through an inves-
tor questionnaire, facilitate the account opening process and deliver
account communications;
• Comparatively lower advisory fees than traditional advisory services and
low or no account minimums. Digital advisors typically charge a single
‘wrap’ fee that covers discretionary management services and execution
of client transactions. Many digital advisors have positioned themselves
as a low-cost alternative to investment advisory products that offer a
more comprehensive suite of services;
• A focus on goals-based investing where clients define their objectives
based on specific life goals (e.g., saving for a house, retirement or a
child’s education) and measure performance based on progress toward
that goal, rather than focusing exclusively on maximizing portfolio
returns measured in relation to a benchmark;
• Personalized asset allocation recommendations generated by matching
client profile information with a diversified portfolio of low cost, tax
efficient, exchange-traded funds (ETFs);
• Discretionary investment advice that leverages algorithms to automati-
cally monitor client positions against target asset allocation and risk
thresholds associated with a client’s investment strategy;
• Automated rebalancing designed to monitor for drifts from the
intended asset allocation and generate trade orders for execution in
order to ‘rebalance’ the client’s account back to its intended asset
allocation, as well as leveraging cash in-flows and out-flows to rebalance
an account; and
• Implementation of certain investment strategies designed to minimize
a client’s tax burden (e.g., tax-loss harvesting1 or asset placement2).
The emergence of digital advice is particularly significant for investors
who were not previously able to access any advice because of the minimum
balances required by other service models, but investors at every level of
wealth have been drawn to the value, accessibility, and transparency offered
by digital advice.
Many industry participants have commented on the transformative poten-
tial of digital investment advice. Of particular note, the former Chair of the
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) observed that digital invest-
ment advice holds the ‘positive potential to give retail investors broader, and
more affordable, access to our markets’ (White 2016: n.p.). This chapter
explores the application of fiduciary standards to digital advisors. It con-
cludes that fiduciary standards, such as those incorporated into the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), are flexible principles that digital
advisors and their nondigital counterparts (traditional advisors) are equally
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capable of satisfying. Investors benefit from this regulatory flexibility, which
encourages innovation and permits the development of more varied ser-
vices. Indeed, the Advisers Act already accommodates investment advisors
with a wide variety of business models, investment strategies, and services.
This chapter also explains that the products and services offered by digital
advisors are not unique, but instead are technologically enhanced versions
of advisory programs and services that have long been subject to this flexible
regulatory framework. Finally, this chapter discusses the innovative and
powerful ways that digital advisors can more effectively serve their clients,
including by harnessing the efficiencies of technology and insights from
behavioral finance.
Drivers behind the Growth of Digital Advice
Americans find themselves in the midst of what many commentators and
governmental officials have termed a ‘retirement savings crisis’ (USGAO
2017; Samuels 2018). On the one hand, people are increasingly responsible
for managing their own retirement savings because of the disappearance of
defined benefit plans, deteriorating confidence in the long-term viability of
the social security system, and concern that social security payments will
provide insufficient retirement income. Only 18 percent of American work-
ers today reportedly are very confident that they will have enough money for
a comfortable retirement, and participation in employee savings plans is at
historic lows (Greenwald et al. 2017; USDOL 2017). Moreover, more than
half of current households approaching retirement have no savings, and a
large proportion of those with savings do not have enough to maintain their
standard of living in retirement (USGAO 2017). Many of those able to
maintain their standard of living may only be able to do so due to rising
property values (Fox 2018). On the other hand, many investors who would
benefit from professional advice are not able to meet the high account
minimums that often accompany access to financial advisors (Fischer 2016).
Against this backdrop it is not surprising that there is tremendous hunger
among the investing public for accessible, low-cost, and reliable advice.
While some investors may still seek the services of a traditional advisor—
and have sufficient assets to qualify for those services—others seek a differ-
ent sort of advisory experience, at a different price point, to help them
navigate the complexity of saving for retirement and other financial mile-
stones. The availability of digital advice promotes the important policy
objective of expanding access to retirement advice to a growing segment
of underserved and undersaved Americans.
At the same time, the growing awareness of the importance of fees in
driving investment outcomes has led both investors and digital advisors to
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focus on the benefits of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The maturation and
growth of the ETF market over the last two decades has produced a broad
range of products covering different asset classes, markets, styles, and geo-
graphies (ICI 2017). ETFs, which are traded intraday and are offered
without the sales loads and internal distribution costs that can drive up
expense ratios in other investment products, are a transparent, low-cost,
and tax-efficient investment option. In addition, the passive index bias that
is prevalent in the ETF market fits well with the diversification tenets of
Modern Portfolio Theory. The use of passive ETFs allows digital advisors to
create and manage inexpensive, broadly diversified global portfolios corre-
lated to particular risk and return characteristics.
The growth of digital advice has also been accelerated by advances in
technology that allow for a more personalized, efficient, and seamless user
experience. This appeals to the growing number of consumers who expect
their financial providers to keep pace with the user experiences offered by
other consumer services and who are comfortable relying on digital solu-
tions to help manage their financial lives.3 Banks and financial services firms
are capitalizing on this trend by developing digital advice solutions designed
to attract new clients and provide a broader range of services to existing
clients (Desai 2016; Flood 2016). Like digital advisors, these traditional
advisors also recognize that such solutions appeal to the investing needs
and expectations of a previously underserved segment of the investing
public (Terekhova 2017).
Digital Advice is Fiduciary Advice
A key distinction between digital and traditional advisors is the more limited
nature of the client interaction in the robo-setting. Nevertheless, the fact
that digital advisors do not interface with their clients in the same way as
traditional advisors does not mean that they are not fiduciaries to their
clients, or that they cannot fulfill the fiduciary standards that govern an
investment advisory relationship.
Fiduciary duties are imposed on investment advisors ‘by operation of law
because of the nature of the relationship between the two parties’ (SEC
2013: n.p.). This is made enforceable by Section 206 of the Advisers Act,
which applies to all firms meeting the Advisers Act’s ‘definition of invest-
ment adviser, whether registered with the [SEC], a state securities authority,
or not at all’ (SEC 2011a: n.p.). Investment advisors, including digital advi-
sors, have an affirmative duty to act with the utmost good faith, to make full
and fair disclosure of all material facts, and to employ reasonable care to
avoid misleading clients (SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 1963).
Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act make it unlawful for an
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investment advisor ‘to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any
client or prospective client’ or to ‘engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client’ [Investment Advisers Act of 1940 } 206(1) and (2)].
The concepts of fraud in Sections 206(1) and (2) are based on common
law principles4 and include a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. The duty of
loyalty refers to the obligation to act loyally for the client’s benefit, which
requires that the advisor place the client’s interests ahead of its own.5 The
duty of care refers to the obligation to act with the care, competence, and
diligence that would normally be exercised by a fiduciary in similar
circumstances.6
As noted above, the Supreme Court has interpreted Sections 206(1) and
(2) as establishing a federal fiduciary standard for investment advisors (SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 1963). Accordingly, it is an accepted
legal principle that investment advisors, particularly advisors that are man-
aging client assets on a discretionary basis, are fiduciaries (SEC 2011b).
Below we explain the source and parameters of an investment advisor’s
fiduciary duties, and discuss how these duties—the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty—apply to the contours of the digital advisory relationship.
Further, the Staff of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management (SEC
Staff) took a definitive step towards recognizing digital advisors as fiduciaries
in guidance released in February 2017 (February 2017 Guidance) (SEC
2017). This guidance confirms that digital advisors registered as investment
advisors with the SEC are subject to the substantive requirements and
fiduciary obligations of the Advisers Act, even in the case of digital advisors
with more limited business models.
The Fiduciary Standard of Care is Defined
by the Scope of the Relationship
As a threshold matter, no uniform or ‘single’ standard of care applies to all
investment advisory relationships. Under both common law and the Advi-
sers Act, the applicable standard of care may be defined by contract, and the
concepts of reasonable care and skill that are at the heart of any standard of
care necessarily must be judged in relation to the scope of services agreed to
by the client (Frankel et al. 2018).
At common law, the standard of care an agent owes to a principal varies
depending on the parties’ agreement and the scope of their relationship
[Restatement (Third) of Agency } 8.01 cmt. C]. An agent also owes to the
principal a duty of care, which requires the agent to act with the care,
competence, and diligence agents would normally exercise under similar
circumstances. However, the agent and principal may agree to raise or lower
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the duty of care by contract. Even under trust law, which imposes higher
obligations on trustees than exist under agency law, the scope of fiduciary
duties is subject to the terms of the trust. A principal component of the
common law duty of care is the requirement that a trustee act prudently in
light of the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust. The duty
of prudence encompasses the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill and
to ‘act with a degree of caution suitable to the particular trust and its
objectives, circumstances, and overall plan of administration’ [Restatement
(Third) of Trusts } 77, cmt. B]. While the trustee and beneficiary cannot
agree to waive the trustee’s fiduciary obligations under the duties of loyalty
and care in their entirety, trust law, especially trust fiduciary law, is default
law that can be modified by the terms of the trust (Laby 2008). Thus, the
trustee and beneficiary may agree to modify or relax the default obligations
of prudence through the terms of the trust so long as they do not ‘altogether
dispense with the fundamental requirement that trustees not behave reck-
lessly but act in good faith, with some suitable degree of care, and in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests
of the beneficiaries.’7
Consistent with the common law, an investment advisor may limit the
scope of its relationship with a client. In fact, it is not uncommon for
investment advisors of all types to limit the scope of their services and
authority based on the nature of the advisory relationship with their clients.
For example, many traditional advisors prepare financial plans that speak to
clients’ overall investment objectives and financial circumstances at a par-
ticular point in time, thus disclaiming the responsibility to update the
information on an ongoing basis. They also may provide asset allocation
services or recommend investment strategies by researching and monitor-
ing managers or funds, yet disclaim responsibility for making the underlying
investment decisions with respect to those investment strategies or funds.
Traditional advisors provide advice in connection with particular transac-
tions by providing transition assistance to institutional investors transferring
assets from one investment manager to another, yet disclaim responsibility
for selecting individual securities to be bought or sold; they also may provide
discretionary investment management services for one segment of a client’s
overall investment portfolio, and simultaneously disclaim responsibility for
the management of the client’s remaining assets. Finally, advisors may
provide nondiscretionary investment advice that cannot be implemented
without the prior consent of a client; or provide pricing or evaluation
services that are limited to judging the appropriate price of a particular
security or basket of securities.
The SEC has long recognized that investment advisors come in many
shapes and sizes (SEC 2011b). Rather than creating a prescriptive regulatory
regime based on each discrete business model, the SEC has created a
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi
The Transformation of Investment Advice 43
flexible, principles-based regulatory regime focused on an investment ad-
visor’s fiduciary duty to ‘make full and fair disclosure’ of all material facts,
including conflicts of interest between the advisor and its clients and ‘any
other material information that could affect the advisory relationship.’8 The
SEC has generally viewed the negotiation of the terms of an advisory rela-
tionship to occur at arm’s length, provided that the investment advisor has
satisfied its disclosure obligations, including disclosure about the advisor’s
business, material conflicts of interest, disciplinary information, and other
information, so that prospective clients can decide whether to enter into an
advisory agreement with the advisor.9
Further, in the February 2017 Guidance, the Staff took a flexible, rather
than one-size-fits all approach, emphasizing that digital advisors have a wide
variety of business models and offer a range of advisory services, and conse-
quently may have a ‘variety of means’ to meet their regulatory obligations.
The SEC Staff therefore validates the concept that digital advisors may
define and limit the scope of the advisory services they provide. In this
regard, the SEC Staff provided a series of recommendations for how digital
advisors may meet their fiduciary obligations under the Advisers Act. We
discuss a number of these below.
Establishing a Reasonable Basis for Digital Advice
Although there is no comprehensive list of the obligations that flow from
fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act, it seems clear that part of that duty is
to ensure that an advisor has a reasonable basis for its advice (Lemke and
Lims 2018). The extent to which a digital advisor’s client profiling process
provides a reasonable basis for the advice it provides (i.e., its ‘suitability’) has
been a central focus of regulatory guidance and industry commentary. In a
typical digital advisory program, an initial asset allocation recommendation
is made on the basis of a series of questions (an investor questionnaire)
designed to gather information about the client’s investment goals for the
account. The length and types of information requested by a digital advi-
sor’s questionnaire vary from firm to firm. As discussed below, under estab-
lished regulatory principles and the 2017 Guidance, the information
captured in the client-profiling process should be evaluated in relation to
the nature of the advice that is provided.
The Advisers Act does not dictate the minimum amount of information
that must be collected to make a reasonable determination that investment
advice is appropriate for a client. In fact, unlike the investment suitability
rules promulgated by the self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Advisers Act does not
prescribe the amount or types of client profile information that are required
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to be collected in any respect. In 1994 the SEC proposed, but did not adopt,
a suitability rule10 that would have required investment advisors to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into a client’s financial situation, investment experience,
and investment objectives before providing advice.11 However, the propos-
ing release makes clear that ‘the extent of the inquiry would turn on what is
reasonable under the circumstances.’ For instance, a ‘comprehensive finan-
cial plan’ may, according to the proposing release, require extensive per-
sonal and financial information about a client, including current income,
investments, assets and debts, marital status, insurance policies and financial
goals. The implication is that an advisory program that is not offering
comprehensive financial planning would not require the collection of
such extensive information.
What is required to make a reasonable determination is a qualitative
rather than a quantitative inquiry, and the type or amount of information
relied upon by an advisor to make a recommendation may vary without
compromising the advice. Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White, in public
remarks addressing digital advisors, has acknowledged that ‘[j]ust like a
conversation with a “real person” about a client’s financial goals, risk toler-
ances, and sophistication may be more or less robust, so too there is varia-
tion in the content and flexibility of information gathered by digital advisors
before advice is given’ (White 2016: n.p.). Even the more prescriptive
FINRA suitability rules provide broker-dealers with the flexibility to omit
certain information from a customer profile if the broker-dealer determines
that information would not be relevant to making a suitability determination
in light of the applicable facts and circumstances (FINRA Rule 2111.04).
The appropriate question is therefore not how much information an
advisor is collecting, but rather whether the information the advisor decides
to collect is appropriate in relation to the nature of the advice that is
provided (FINRA 2016). It follows that where advisors, digital or otherwise,
provide assistance with specific and identifiable investment goals such as
college or retirement savings, they need not collect the same degree of
information, or conduct comparable due diligence, to that which may be
required for a more expansive investment strategy. In the February 2017
Guidance, the SEC Staff emphasized the importance of designing an inves-
tor questionnaire that permits the advisor to collect sufficient information
on which to make an investment recommendation. The SEC Staff (2017)
outlines the following as key considerations that digital advisors should
evaluate when designing their investor questionnaires:
• Whether the questions elicit sufficient information to allow the digital
advisor to conclude that its initial recommendations and ongoing
investment advice are suitable and appropriate for that client based
on his or her financial situation and investment objectives;
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• Whether the questions are sufficiently clear, and whether the investor
questionnaire is designed to provide additional clarification or exam-
ples to clients when necessary; and
• Whether steps have been taken to address inconsistent client responses,
such as incorporating into the investor questionnaire design features to
alert a client when their responses appear internally inconsistent or im-
plementing systems that automatically flag any inconsistent information
provided by a client for further review or follow-up by the digital advisor.
Further, digital advice must be understood in relation to its place in the
market. Many clients who choose a digital advisor have affirmatively chosen
not to enroll in a comprehensive financial planning or investment manage-
ment service. Instead, these investors have opted for goal-based wealth
management (e.g., accumulating for retirement, planning for college edu-
cation, saving for a vacation home). Rather than lumping all assets together
and managing them in relation to a particular benchmark, goal-based
wealth management allows clients to create a separate ‘bucket’ of assets
for each goal and define an investment strategy that is unique to that
particular goal. Investors continue to have the option of working with an
investment advisor that will provide a more comprehensive solution that
considers outside resources, debt, financial history, career, anticipated med-
ical expenses, and a myriad of other factors that could potentially influence
the advice provided to an investor. However, the cost of such advisory
programs will proportionally rise based on the scope of services provided.
Digital Advisors and Conflict of Interest Mitigation
One of the positive features of digital advisors from a fiduciary perspective is
that they typically present fewer conflicts of interest. As fiduciaries, all
advisors owe their clients a duty of loyalty [Restatement (Third) of Agency
} 8.01 and Restatement (Third) of Trusts } 78(1)]. In common law, this
involves refraining from acting adversely or in competition with the interests
of clients, and not using clients’ property for the advisor’s benefit or for that
of a third party [Restatement (Third) of Agency} 8.01–8.05].The duty of
loyalty consists of the principles that advisors deal fairly with clients and
prospective clients, seek to avoid conflicts of interest, disclose all material
facts for any actual or potential conflicts of interest that may affect the
advisor’s impartiality, and not subrogate client interests to their own. Con-
sistent with common law, the federal regulatory framework governing invest-
ment advisors is a disclosure-based regime that does not preclude an advisor
from acting where there is an actual or potential conflict of interest, pro-
vided that full and fair disclosure is made to clients.
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By emphasizing transparent and straightforward fee structures, prevailing
digital advice business models inherently minimize conflicts of interest asso-
ciated with traditional investment advisors. Digital advisory offerings are
typically comprised of ETFs that, in comparison to mutual funds, offer little
room for revenue streams and payment shares that would otherwise create a
conflict of interest for investment advisors (e.g., 12b-1 fees, subtransfer agent
fees). The absence of such compensation factors means that comparatively
fewer conflicts of interest are present even where digital advisors are affiliated
with some of the ETFs that they recommend, and independent digital advi-
sors reduce such conflicts even further. Moreover, digital advisory solutions
eliminate the representative-level conflicts of interest typically present in the
nondigital advisory context because there is little or no role for financial
advisors who receive incentive-based compensation in an online offering.
Accordingly, digital advisory solutions are less susceptible to the financial
incentives that create conflicts of interest, disclosure, and sales practice and
supervisory issues resulting from the compensation paid on accounts recom-
mended and managed by financial advisors (FINRA 2016; SEC 1995).
Importantly, digital advisors remain subject to the fiduciary norms of the
Advisers Act and therefore have a duty to make full and fair disclosure of all
material facts to, and employ reasonable care to, avoid misleading, clients. As
stated by the SEC Staff in the February 2017 Guidance, the information
provided by a digital advisor to its clients must be sufficiently specific so that
clients are able to understand the advisor’s business practices and conflicts of
interest, andmust be presented in amanner that clients are likely to read and
understand (SEC 2017). The SEC Staff views the substance and presentation
of disclosures as particularly important in the digital advisor context, because,
in the absence of any human interaction, clients may look solely to electronic
disclosures in order to make an informed decision about whether to enter
into an investment advisory relationship with a digital advisor. As a result, the
SEC Staff has noted that digital advisors should consider disclosing certain
information regarding the limitations, risks, and operational considerations
of certain defining aspects of their business model and advisory services. This
includes disclosure about the following areas, among others:
Methodology and services. A description of the assumptions and limitations
of algorithms used to manage client accounts, together with a description of
the particular risks inherent in the use of an algorithm to manage client
accounts, an explanation of the degree of human involvement in the over-
sight and management of individual client accounts (e.g., that investment
advisory personnel oversee the algorithm but may not monitor each client’s
account); a description of how the digital advisor uses the information
gathered from a client to generate a recommended portfolio and any
limitations, such as whether responses to an informational questionnaire
are the sole basis on which advice is provided.
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Limitations and scope of advisory services. A description of any circum-
stances that might cause a digital advisor to override the algorithm used to
manage client accounts. For instance, digital advisors should disclose
whether they might suspend or delay trading or take other temporary
defensive measures in stressed market conditions. Further, digital advisors
should be precise about the nature and extent of the advisory services that
are provided; digital advisors that do not offer a comprehensive financial
plan should be precise about how advice is being provided with respect to
specific financial goals identified by the client, and digital advisors should
further not create the implication that their algorithms consider informa-
tion outside of an investor questionnaire if that is not the case.
Conflicts. A description of any involvement by a third party in the develop-
ment, management, or ownership of the algorithm used to manage client
accounts, including an explanation of any conflicts of interest such an
arrangement may create (e.g., if the third party offers the algorithm to the
digital advisor at a discount, but the algorithm directs clients into products
from which the third party earns a fee). Digital advisors should also disclose
any financial incentives they may have to recommend particular investment
products, including proprietary ETFs for which they or an affiliate receive
advisory fees, licensing fees, distribution and servicing fees, revenue sharing
or other compensation.
Fees and expenses. An explanation of any fees the client will be charged
directly, such as advisory fees, as well as any other costs that the client may
bear either directly or indirectly such fees and expenses investors bear in
connection with an investment in the underlying investment products,
custodial services, and brokerage and other transaction costs.
The SEC Staff further views the presentation of disclosures as a key
component in meeting a digital advisor’s fiduciary obligations to clients,
given that the client relationship and display of key disclosures will take
place primarily, if not entirely, through an online or application-based
interface. With respect to the timing of disclosure, the SEC Staff suggests
that digital advisors present ‘key disclosures’ prior to the sign-up process, so
that information necessary to make an informed investment decision is
available to clients prior to entering into an investment advisory relation-
ship. The SEC Staff has also provided guidance on effective disclosure to
clients can be made through the types of interactive online interfaces or
mobile platforms that are commonly used. Specifically, the SEC Staff re-
commends that digital advisors emphasize key disclosures through design
features such as pop-up boxes, or include interactive text (e.g., hover-over
boxes that function as ‘tooltips’) or other means of providing additional
details to clients who are seeking more information (for instance, through
an FAQ section).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi
48 The Impact of FinTech on Retirement Systems
Application of the Existing Regulatory Framework
for Investment Advisory Services
Digital advisors are a disruptive and competitive alternative to traditional
advisors, but the advisory services they offer build upon the traditional
advisory framework and its regulatory structure, rather than depart from
it. The range of advisory services offered by digital advisors—from online
asset allocation recommendations to discretionary managed accounts com-
prised of diversified portfolios of ETFs—follow well-worn regulatory paths
governing the use of electronic media, the use of interactive websites to
deliver advice, and the governance of separately managed account and wrap
fee programs. Further, the history of these services underscore that the
Advisers Act is a flexible and technologically neutral regulatory regime
that has accommodated technological change, innovation in products and
services, and evolving business models.
Electronic media. In 1995, the SEC published its first interpretation on the
use of electronic media to deliver regulatory communications. This release
and the others that followed recognized the power of technology and,
specifically, the electronic distribution of information, to ‘enhance the
efficiency of the securities markets by allowing for the rapid dissemination
of information to investors and financial markets in a more cost-efficient,
widespread, and equitable manner than traditional paper-based methods’
(SEC 1995). In providing this guidance, however, the SEC also clearly
established the principle that the securities laws are technologically neutral.
The use of electronic media did not change the substantive provisions of the
federal securities laws. In fact, the SEC specifically stated that the guidance
set forth in the 1995 release ‘addresses only the procedural aspects under
the federal securities laws of electronic delivery, and does not affect the
rights and responsibilities of any party under the federal securities laws.’ In
the 1995 release and in a subsequent release in 1996 extending the same
principles to the delivery of required communications under the Advisers
Act, the SEC was clear that the ‘liability provisions of the federal securities
laws apply equally to electronic and paper-based media.’
The SEC recognized the presence of digital advice and its compatibility
with the framework of the Advisers Act when it adopted the so-called
‘Internet Investment Advisers Exemption’ in 2002 (SEC 2002). This exemp-
tion permits advisors that provide personalized investment advice exclu-
sively through interactive websites to register as investment advisors at the
federal level without necessarily meeting the regulatory assets under man-
agement threshold that is typically required of an SEC registered advisor. In
adopting the exemption, the SEC acknowledged that it had to create a new
basis for registration that captured investment advisors that did not techni-
cally have regulatory assets under management (the exemption assumed a
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business model under which advisors were not providing continuous and
regular supervisory services). However, the SEC never considered changing
the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act to address internet advisors
solely because they provide advice through an interactive website.
Safe harbor from investment company registration.Digital advisors generally
manage client assets on a discretionary basis through separately managed
account and wrap programs,12 which are subject to a longstanding regulatory
regime under Rule 3a-4 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Company
Act). Rule 3a-4 provides advisors that manage discretionary investment advi-
sory programs with a nonexclusive safe harbor from being classified as oper-
ating an investment company (or mutual fund), which therefore requires the
advisors to comply with extensive compliance and reporting requirements
under the Company Act.13 Rule 3a-4 was designed to address programs where
advisors seek ‘to provide the same or similar professional portfolio manage-
ment services on a discretionary basis to a large number of advisory clients
having relatively small amounts to invest.’ Advisory programs that are organ-
ized and operated in accordance with the rule are not deemed to be de facto
investment companies so long as they comply with a number of conditions
designed to ensure that clients receive individualized treatment and there is
no pooling of assets.
In a typical discretionary digital advice program, investors establish indi-
vidual brokerage accounts to custody their assets, and the digital advisor
selects and manages a portfolio of ETFs based on an asset allocation recom-
mended by the advisor and selected by the client. Although many digital
advisory services give clients theflexibility to change their asset allocation on a
regular basis through a website or mobile application, the digital advisor
retains the authority to manage the account based on the asset allocation
parameters the client designates. This type of digital advisory service is not a
radical departure from the norm. To the contrary, the wealth-management
industry, which includes separatelymanaged account andwrap fee programs,
today accounts for $6.1 trillion in assets under management (MMI 2018).
Rule 3a-4 contains two key provisions that a digital advisor must satisfy in
order to fit within the safe harbor. The first is that ‘each client’s account in
the program is managed on the basis of the client’s financial situation and
investment objectives and in accordance with any reasonable restrictions
imposed by the client on the management of the account’[17 C.F.R.
} 270.3a–4(a)(1)]. The second is that the ‘sponsor and personnel of the
manager of the client’s account who are knowledgeable about the account
and its management are reasonably available to the client for consultation’
[17 C.F.R } 270.3a–4(a)(2)(iv)].
With respect to the first provision relating to individualized advice, it is
important to understand that this requirement of Rule 3a-4 is not a
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suitability rule that requires advisors to collect specific information concern-
ing the financial situation and investment objectives of each client, nor does
the rule dictate the quantity of information that must be collected. Rather,
the intent of this provision is to negate the inference that the discretionary
managed account program is operating as a pooled investment company. In
many cases, digital advisors do far more than simply provide online tools
that allow self-directed investors to determine their own risk tolerance and
investment preferences and then subscribe to a model portfolio designed
for investors with similar preferences. Digital advisors may permit customi-
zation by giving clients the ability to impose reasonable restrictions on the
management of their accounts by designating certain ticker or security
limitations. Moreover, digital advisors typically offer many features and
tools that a client or financial advisor may use to customize managed
account portfolios, including tools designed to optimize an existing portfo-
lio; portfolio allocations that clients may customize to their desired asset
class mix; options to select preferences for affiliated funds or apply ESG
(environmental, social and governance investing) screens; the ability to
retain legacy positions; sophisticated, technology-driven portfolio rebalan-
cing based on market changes, cash in-flows and out-flows, and risk para-
meters; and asset placement and tax-loss harvesting services. The result is
that the digital advisory model enables clients to receive investment advice
that is customized to their particular investment goals and needs.
Moreover, digital advisors are ‘reasonably available’ to clients consistent
with Rule 3a-4. The requirement that the manager of the account be
reasonably available for consultation is one of many factors that distinguish
a separate account holder from a mutual fund investor. A mutual fund
investor generally would not have access to the portfolio manager of the
fund. But, Rule 3a-4 does not dictate how that access needs to be accom-
plished. Digital advisors may satisfy this aspect of the safe harbor by making
appropriate personnel reasonably available to clients by phone, e-mail, or
platform-enabled chat services. In addition, there is no requirement that
clients have the ability to discuss their portfolio with the individuals respon-
sible for developing the advice algorithm. Rather, the focus is one whether
the client has the ability to communicate with the advisor about questions
relating to the management of his or her particular account. Further, Digital
advisors typically provide their clients with around-the-clock access to a great
deal of interactive real-time information about the holdings, performance
and attributes of their accounts. Digital advisors generally make a great deal
of information about their investment philosophy and approach available to
investors through articles, blogs, and social media posts.
It is not surprising that the application of Rule 3a-4 looks different in the
context of a digital offering, but that does not mean that digital advisors are
operating unregistered investment companies. To the contrary, under digital
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offerings clients still receive the benefit of personalized advice and individua-
lized treatment, and they maintain all of the indicia of ownership of the ETFs
and other securities held in their accounts. It is important to note that, to
date, the SEC Staff has not substantively addressed how digital advisors in
particularmaymeet the Rule 3a-4 safe harbor. However, in the February 2017
Guidance the SEC Staff did remind digital advisors to consider their obliga-
tions under Rule 3a-4, and it encouraged them to contact the SEC for further
guidance if they believe that their organizations and operations raise unique
facts or circumstances ‘not addressed’ by Rule 3a-4 (SEC 2017).
Algorithm governance and compliance considerations. In its February 2017
Guidance, the SEC Staff provided a number of practical recommendations
to digital advisors for how they may fulfill their fiduciary and substantive
obligations under the Advisers Act. These recommendations are not a
departure from the fiduciary standards within the regulatory framework
for investment advisors, but rather provide the SEC Staff ’s perspective on
the application of the existing regulatory and fiduciary framework to the
digital advice model. In particular, the SEC Staff views the implementation
of controls around the development, testing, and back-testing of the algo-
rithmic code used by digital advisors, as well as the post-implementation
monitoring of an algorithm’s performance, as a key element of an invest-
ment advisor’s compliance program. The SEC Staff recommends that digital
advisors adopt and implement written policies and procedures that provide
for testing of their algorithms before, and periodically after, they have been
integrated into the digital advisor’s platform. Testing should assess whether
the algorithmic code is performing as represented, and should occur on all
modifications to an algorithm that is currently being used to ensure that it
does not adversely affect client accounts. Further, the staff recommends that
digital advisors whose algorithms or software modules are developed,
owned, or managed by a third party adopt written controls for appropriate
oversight of such third parties.
Digital Advice is Human Advice, with Certain
Unique Advantages
Digital advisors possess unique advantages that strengthen the fiduciary
relationship and promote the delivery of sophisticated, consistent advice.
As discussed below, human intellect and judgment is an integral component
of the digital advice model, which itself brings a number of positive features
that help to serve clients in innovative and powerful ways.
First, the algorithms used by digital advisors are developed by humans,
and they must be monitored and overseen by investment and technology
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professionals. Rather than take human judgment out of the equation, the
skill and investment expertise of these professionals is reflected in the
algorithms used to manage client accounts. Digital advisors thus leverage
technology to make the value provided by talented portfolio managers and
investment professionals available to the broadest universe of clients. Fur-
ther, digital advice presents strong advantages with respect to the consist-
ency, precision, and predictability of advice (Philippon 2019).Unlike advice
delivered exclusively by individual human financial advisors, digital advice
can mitigate instances of distraction, fatigue, or human bias that can lead to
negative client investment outcomes or costly trade errors.
Additionally, digital advice tools can be used to rebalance portfolios,
conduct daily portfolio reviews, and apply new investment insights across
many different client accounts in a way that would not be economically or
operationally feasible for individual human financial advisors. This pro-
motes faster, smarter, and more effective investment decisions, which can
help client portfolios stay on track and within applicable risk thresholds and
efficiently allocate even the smallest cash flows across their investment
portfolio. Moreover, automated investing enables digital advisors to more
effectively implement their compliance programs and meet regulatory ob-
ligations. In contrast to advice delivered through individual human financial
advisors, which may be offered ad hoc, by phone, or conducted without
reliable documentation, digital advice enables the consistent application of
investment methodologies and strategies to client accounts, providing trans-
parency, improved recordkeeping, and ease of audit.
Second, humans are operationally present in the delivery of digital advice.
A number of digital advisors offer live customer support to assist clients and
answer service-related questions. Some digital advisors offer a so-called
‘hybrid model’ where clients have the ability to speak with live investment
advisor representatives. Digital advisors also have the capability to commu-
nicate instantaneously through email, mobile applications and their web
interfaces to clients at a scale that far surpasses what an individual human
financial advisor would be able to accomplish. Such communication features
can be used to provide real-time account data or tailored portfolio analysis to
clients at intervals of their choosing. Whereas an individual human financial
advisor may be unable to reach even a small subset of its clients in a timely
manner, a digital advisor may provide important and personalized account
updates to its clients on a real-time basis (Fisch et al. 2019).
Finally, digital investment advice platforms are able to leverage behavioral
finance insights to offer innovative services and account features in a timely
and consistent way. Digital advisors may collect data and observations based
on a client’s online behavior (either individually or in the aggregate) and
use the information to enhance the client experience and promote positive
investment outcomes (Barber and Odean 2000).For instance, digital
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advisors may observe that investors who look at their accounts frequently are
more inclined to rebalance their portfolios in the event of minor losses that
result from normal intraday market movements. In this way, digital advisors
are able to focus on the actual behavioral patterns of clients, and this
observed behavior tends to offer insights that clients are not aware of or
may not voice to their financial advisors. Digital advisors may leverage such
observations to guide investors away from missteps that could lead to nega-
tive investment outcomes. In response to actions involving contributions to
or transfers from advisory accounts, for example, digital advisors can pro-
vide personalized recommendations and reminders that promote positive
financial behaviors. These communications may take the form of reinforce-
ment of savings and guidance around transfers that may have undesirable
tax consequences (Barber and Odean 2013).
Conclusion
Under established principles of fiduciary law, digital advisors are capable of
fulfilling fiduciary standards that are consistent with the scope and nature of
the advisory services they provide to clients. Rather than a radical departure,
digital advice reflects the technological evolution of traditional advisory
services and thus fits entirely within the existing regulatory framework
governing investment advisors.
Digital advice offers the investing public a high-quality, transparent advi-
sory product that entails a different blend of services, generally at a lower
cost, than traditional advisors. Digital advice can help achieve the important
policy objective of addressing the retirement crisis by providing advice that is
accessible to individual investors—both financially and technologically.
That includes investors who do not qualify for, or may not be able to afford,
traditional advice. Digital advice presents the next step in the evolution of
investment advisory services, and when offered pursuant to applicable fidu-
ciary standards and the existing regulatory requirements imposed by the
Advisers Act, provides a compelling mechanism to address the demand for
low-cost advisory solutions for retirement savings.
Notes
1. Tax loss harvesting is a strategy used to reduce capital gains tax exposure by selling
one or more securities that can generate tax losses to offset capital gains. The
proceeds of the sale are generally held in cash or, more commonly, invested in
securities that provide similar market exposure.
2. Asset placement considers the tax treatment of different investments in deter-
mining whether to hold securities in taxable or non-taxable accounts.
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3. A recent survey found that among affluent and high net worth investors, 64%
expect their future wealth management relationships to be digital, and for those
under the age of 40, 82% expect a digital relationship. A further 69% would be
inclined to leave a wealth management firm if a digital component was not
integrated into a wealth manager’s offering. A separate survey by Wells Fargo/
Gallup in found that 54% of investors would trust advice from an adviser that has
‘good’ applications and digital investing tools more than advice delivered by a less
technologically savvy adviser (see Vakta and Chugh 2014; Wells Fargo 2016).
4. See, e.g., In re Brandt, Kelly & Simmons, LLC & Kenneth G. Brandt, SEC Administra-
tive Proceeding File No. 3–11672 (Sept. 21, 2004) (alleging that respondent
‘willfully violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which incorporate
common law principles of fiduciary duties’ (emphasis added)).
5. See Restatement (Third) of Agency } 8.01 (2006) (‘An agent has a fiduciary duty
to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the
agency relationship.’); } 8.01, cmt. b (‘Although an agent’s interests are often
concurrent with those of the principal, the general fiduciary principle requires
that the agent subordinate the agent’s interest to those of the principal and place
the principal’s interests first as to matters connected with the agency relation-
ship.’); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts } 78(1) (2007) (‘Except as otherwise
provided in the terms of the trust, a trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of its charitable
purposes.’)
6. See Restatement (Third) of Agency } 8.08 (‘[A]n agent has a duty to the principal
to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in
similar circumstances.’); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts } 77 (noting that a
trustee has a duty to act with the exercise of ‘reasonable care, skill, and caution’).
7. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts } 76 cmt. b(1) (‘A trustee has both (i) a duty
generally to comply with the terms of the trust and (ii) a duty to comply with the
mandates of trust law except as permissibly modified by the terms of the trust.
Because of this combination of duties, the fiduciary duties of trusteeship some-
times override or limit the effect of a trustee’s duty to comply with trust provisions;
conversely, the normal standards of trustee conduct prescribed by trust fiduciary
law may, at least to some extent, be modified by the terms of the trust.’) See also
Restatement (Third) of Trustsat } 77 cmt. d(3).
8. See Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2711 (Mar. 3, 2008)
(Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter, ‘Form ADV Proposing Release’] (see General
Instruction No. 3 & n.148); Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act
Rel. No. 3060 (July 28, 2010) [hereinafter, ‘Form ADV Adopting Release’]. The
Form ADV Proposing Release reflects the SEC’s view that investment advisers
should do more than simply identify a potential conflict of interest and should
also explain generally how they address that conflict.
9. The Advisers Act recognizes the arm’s-length nature of the negotiation of an
advisory relationship in not requiring that an investment advisory contract be in
writing, or otherwise prescribing its terms, other than with respect to the receipt
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of performance compensation, assignment of the contract, and change in
ownership where the adviser is a partnership.
10. Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Rel. No. 1406 (Mar. 16, 1994).
11. Although the SEC did not adopt the proposed rule, the Staff of the Division of
Investment Management has taken the position that ‘the rule would have
codified existing suitability obligations of advisers and, as a result, the proposed
rule reflects the current obligation of advisers under the [Advisers] Act’ (see
Regulation of Investment Advisers by the US Securities and Exchange Commission at 23
n.134).
12. A wrap fee program, as defined by the SEC’s Glossary of Terms to Form ADV, is
‘any advisory program under which a specified fee or fees not based directly
upon transactions in a client’s account is charged for investment advisory ser-
vices (which may include portfolio management or advice concerning the
selection of other investment advisers) and the execution of client transactions.’
13. Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
Investment Company Act Rel. No. 22579 [hereinafter, ‘Rule 3a-4 Adopting
Release’] (Mar. 24, 1997). Note that Rule 3a-4 formalized a long line of no-
action letters that went back to 1980 that included conditions on which the rule
was ultimately based.
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